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Abstract. The first separation between quantum polynomial time and classical bounded-error polynomial time was
due to Bernstein and Vazirani in 1993. They first showed aO(1) vs.Ω(n) quantum-classical oracle separation based
on the quantum Hadamard transform, and then showed how to amplify this into a nO(1) time quantum algorithm
and a nΩ(log n) classical query lower bound.
We generalize both aspects of this speedup. We show that a wide class of unitary circuits (which we call dispersing
circuits) can be used in place of Hadamards to obtain a O(1) vs. Ω(n) separation. The class of dispersing circuits
includes all quantum Fourier transforms (including over nonabelian groups) as well as nearly all sufficiently long
random circuits. Second, we give a general method for amplifying quantum-classical separations that allows us to
achieve a nO(1) vs. nΩ(log n) separation from any dispersing circuit.
1 Background
Understanding the power of quantum computation relative to classical computation is a fundamental ques-
tion. When we look at which problems can be solved in quantum but not classical polynomial time, we get
a wide range: quantum simulation, factoring, approximating the Jones polynomial, Pell’s equation, estimat-
ing Gauss sums, period-finding, group order-finding and even detecting some mildly non-abelian symme-
tries [Sho97,Hal07,Wat01,FIM+03,vDHI03]. However, when we look at what algorithmic tools exist on a
quantum computer, the situation is not nearly as diverse. Apart from the BQP-complete problems [AJL06],
the main tool for solving most of these problems is a quantum Fourier transform (QFT) over some group.
Moreover, the successes have been for cases where the group is abelian or close to abelian in some way. For
sufficiently nonabelian groups, there has been no indication that the transforms are useful even though they
can be computed exponentially faster than classically. For example, while an efficient QFT for the symmet-
ric group has been intensively studied for over a decade because of its connection to graph isomorphism, it
is still unknown whether it can be used to achieve any kind of speedup over classical computation [Bea97].
The first separation between quantum computation and randomized computation was the Recursive
Fourier Sampling problem (RFS) [BV97]. This algorithm had two components, namely using a Fourier
transform, and using recursion. Shortly after this, Simon’s algorithm and then Shor’s algorithm for factoring
were discovered, and the techniques from these algorithms have been the focus of most quantum algo-
rithmic research since [Sim97,Sho97]. These developed into the hidden subgroup framework. The hidden
subgroup problem is an oracle problem, but solving certain cases of it would result in solutions for factor-
ing, graph isomorphism, and certain shortest lattice vector problems. Indeed, it was hoped that an algorithm
for graph isomorphism could be found, but recent evidence suggests that this approach may not lead to
one [HMR+06]. As a way to understand new techniques, this oracle problem has been very important, and
it is also one of the very few where super-polynomial speedups have been found [IMS01,BCvD05].
In comparison to factoring, the RFS problem has received much less attention. The problem is defined
as a property of a tree with labeled nodes and it was proven to be solvable with a quantum algorithm
super-polynomially faster than the best randomized algorithm. This tree was defined in terms of the Fourier
coefficients over Zn2 . The definition was rather technical, and it seemed that the simplicity of the Fourier
coefficients for this group was necessary for the construction to work. Even the variants introduced by
2 Sean Hallgren and Aram W. Harrow
Aaronson [Aar03] were still based on the same QFT over Zn2 , which seemed to indicate that this particular
abelian QFT was a key part of the quantum advantage for RFS.
The main result of this paper is to show that the RFS structure can be generalized far more broadly. In
particular, we show that an RFS-style super-polynomial speedup is achievable using almost any quantum
circuit, and more specifically, it is also true for any Fourier transform (even nonabelian), not just over Zn2 .
This illustrates a more general power that quantum computation has over classical computation when using
recursion. The condition for a quantum circuit to be useful for an RFS-style speedup is that the circuit be
dispersing, a concept we introduce to mean that it takes many different inputs to fairly even superpositions
over most of the computational basis.
Our algorithm should be contrasted with the original RFS algorithm. One of the main differences be-
tween classical and quantum computing is so-called garbage that results from computing. It is important in
certain cases, and crucial in recursion-based quantum algorithms because of quantum superpositions, that in-
termediate computations are uncomputed and that errors do not compound. The original RFS paper [BV97]
avoided the error issue by using an oracle problem where every quantum state create from it had the exact
property necessary with no errors. Their algorithm could have tolerated polynomially small errors, but in this
paper we relax this significantly. We show that even if we can only create states with constant accuracy at
each level of recursion, we can still carry through a recursive algorithm which introduces new constant-sized
errors a polynomial number of times.
The main technical part of our paper shows that most quantum circuits can be used to construct sepa-
rations relative to appropriate oracles. To understand the difficulty here, consider two problems that occur
when one tries to define an oracle whose output is related to the amplitudes that result from running a circuit.
First, it is not clear how to implement such an oracle since different amplitudes have different magnitudes,
and only phases can be changed easily. Second, we need an oracle where we can prove that a classical al-
gorithm requires many queries to solve the problem. If the oracle outputs many bits, this can be difficult or
impossible to achieve. For example, the matrix entries of nonabelian groups can quickly reveal which rep-
resentation is being used. To overcome these two problems we show that there are binary-valued functions
that can approximate the complex-valued output of quantum circuits in a certain way.
One by-product of our algorithm is related to the Fourier transform of the symmetric group. Despite
some initial promise for solving graph isomorphism, the symmetric group QFT has still not found any
application in quantum algorithms. One instance of our result is the first example of a problem (albeit a rather
artificial one) where the QFT over the symmetric group is used to achieve a super-polynomial speedup.
2 Statement of results
Our main contributions are to generalize the RFS algorithm of [BV97] in two stages. First, [BV97] described
the problem of Fourier sampling over Zn2 , which has an O(1) vs. Ω(n) separation between quantum and
randomized complexities. We show that here the QFT over Zn2 can be replaced with a QFT over any group,
or for that matter with almost any quantum circuit. Next, [BV97] turned Fourier sampling into recursive
Fourier sampling with a recursive technique. We will generalize this construction to cope with error and to
amplify a larger class of quantum speedups. As a result, we can turn any of the linear speedups we have
found into superpolynomial speedups
Let us now explain each of these steps in more detail. We replace the O(1) vs Ω(n) separation based on
Fourier sampling with a similar separation based on a more general problem called oracle identification. In
the oracle identification problem, we are given access to an oracle Oa : X → {0, 1} where a ∈ A, for some
sets A and X with log |A|, log |X| = Θ(n). Our goal is to determine the identity of a. Further, assume that
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we have access to a testing oracle Ta : A → {0, 1} defined by Ta(a′) = δa,a′ , that will let us confirm that
we have the right answer.3
A quantum algorithm for identifying a can be described as follows: first prepare a state |ϕa〉 using
q queries to Oa, then perform a POVM {Πa′}a′∈A (with
∑
a′ Πa′ ≤ I to allow for the possibility of a
“failure” outcome), using no further queries toOa. The success probability is 〈ϕa|Πa|ϕa〉. For our purposes,
it will suffice to place a Ω(1) lower bound on this probability: say that for each a, 〈ϕa|Πa|ϕa〉 ≥ δ for some
constant δ > 0. On the other hand, any classical algorithm trivially requires≥ log(|A|δ) = Ω(n) oracle calls
to identify a with success probability ≥ δ. This is because each query returns only one bit of information. In
Theorem 9 we will describe how a large class of quantum circuits can achieve this O(1) vs. Ω(n) separation,
and in Theorems 11 and 12 we will show specifically that QFTs and most random circuits fall within this
class.
Now we describe the amplification step. This is a variant of the [BV97] procedure in which making
an oracle call in the original problem requires solving a sub-problem from the same family as the original
problem. Iterating this ℓ times turns query complexity q into qΘ(ℓ), so choosing ℓ = Θ(log n) will yield
the desired polynomial vs. super-polynomial separation. We will generalize this construction by defining an
amplified version of oracle identification called recursive oracle identification. This is described in the next
section, where we will see how it gives rise to superpolynomial speedups from a broad class of circuits.
We conclude that quantum speedups—even superpolynomial speedups—are much more common than
the conventional wisdom would suggest. Moreover, as useful as the QFT has been to quantum algorithms,
it is far from the only source of quantum algorithmic advantage.
3 Recursive amplification
In this section we show that once we are given a constant versus linear separation (for quantum versus
classical oracle identification), we are able to amplify this to a super-polynomial speedup. We require a
much looser definition than in [BV97] because the constant case can have a large error.
Definition 1. For sets A,X, let f : A × X → {0, 1} be a function. To set the scale of the problem, let
|X| = 2n and |A| = 2Ω(n). Define the set of oracles {Oa : a ∈ A} by Oa(x) = f(a, x), and the states
|ϕa〉 = 1√
|X|
∑
x∈X(−1)f(a,x)|x〉. The single-level oracle identification problem is defined to be the task of
determining a given access to Oa. Let U be a family of quantum circuits, implicitly depending on n. We say
that U solves the single-level oracle identification problem if
|〈a|U |ϕa〉|2 ≥ Ω(1)
for all sufficiently large n and all a ∈ A. In this case, we define the POVM {Πa}a∈A by Πa = U † |a〉〈a|U .
When this occurs, it means that a can be identified from Oa with Ω(1) success probability and using a
single query. In the next section, we will show how a broad class of unitaries U (the so-called dispersing
unitaries) allow us to construct f for which U solves the single-level oracle identification problem. There
are natural generalizations to oracle identification problems requiring many queries, but we will not explore
them here.
Theorem 2. Suppose we are given a single-level oracle problem with function f and unitary U running in
time poly(n). Then we can construct a modified oracle problem from f which can be solved by a quantum
3 This will later allow us to turn two-sided into one-sided error; unfortunately it also means that a non-deterministic Turing
machine can find a with a single query to Ta. Thus, while the oracle defined in BV is a candidate for placing BQP outside PH,
ours will not be able to place BQP outside of NP. This limitation appears not to be fundamental, but we will leave the problem
of circumventing it to future work.
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computer in polynomial time (and queries), but requires nΩ(logn) queries for any classical algorithm that
succeeds with probability 12 + n
−o(logn)
.
We start by defining the modified version of the problem (Definition 3 below), and describing a quantum
algorithm to solve it. Then in Theorem 4 we will show that the quantum algorithm solves the problem
correctly in polynomial time, and in Theorem 6, we will show that randomized classical algorithms require
superpolynomial time to have a nonnegligible probability of success.
The recursive version of the problem simply requires that another instance of the problem be solved in
order to access a value at a child. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the problem.
s∅, b∅
sx, bx
sx unlocks bx: O(x, sx) = bx
sx is a function of the by on the level belowy = (x, x′)
sy, by
x = (x1, ..., xk−1)
x′
Fig. 1. A depth k node at location x = (x1, . . . , xk) is labeled by its secret sx and a bit bx. The secret sx can be computed from
the bits by of its children, and once it is known, the bit bx is computed from the oracle O(x, sx) = bx. If x is a leaf then it has no
secret and we simply have bx = O(x). The goal is to compute the secret bit b∅ at the root.
Using the notation from Figure 1, the relation between a secret sx, and the bits by of its children is given
by by = f(sx, x′), where f is the function from the single-level oracle identification problem. Thus by
computing enough of the bits by1 , by2 , . . . corresponding to children y1, y2, . . ., we can solve the single-level
oracle identification problem to find sx. Of course computing the by will require finding the secret strings
sy, which requires finding the bits of their children and so on, until we reach the bottom layer where queries
return answer bits without the need to first produce secret strings.
Definition 3. A level-ℓ recursive oracle identification problem is specified by X,A and f from a single-level
oracle identification problem (Definition 1), any function s : ∅ ∪X ∪X ×X ∪ . . . ∪Xℓ−1 → A, and any
final answer b∅ ∈ {0, 1}. Given these ingredients, an oracle O is defined which takes inputs in
ℓ−1⋃
k=0
[
Xk ×A
]
∪Xℓ
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and to return outputs in {0, 1, FAIL}. On inputs x1, . . . , xk ∈ X, a ∈ A with 1 ≤ k < ℓ, O returns
O(x1, . . . , xk, a) = f(s(x1, . . . , xk−1), xk) when a = s(x1, . . . , xk) (1)
O(x1, . . . , xk, a) = FAIL when a 6= s(x1, . . . , xk). (2)
If k = 0, then O(s(∅)) = b∅ and O(a) = FAIL if a 6= s(∅). When k = ℓ,
O(x1, . . . , xℓ) = f(s(x1, . . . , xℓ−1), xℓ).
The recursive oracle identification problem is to determine b∅ given access to O.
Note that the function s gives the values sx in Figure 1. These values are actually defined in the oracle
and can be chosen arbitrarily at each node. Note also that the oracle defined here effectively includes a
testing oracle, which can determine whether a = s(x1, . . . , xk) for any a ∈ A, x1, . . . , xk ∈ X with one
query. (When x = (x1, . . . , xk), we use s(x1, . . . , xk) and sx interchangeably.) A significant difference
between our construction and that of [BV97] is that the values of s at different nodes can be set completely
independently in our construction, whereas [BV97] had a complicated consistency requirement.
The algorithm. Now we turn to a quantum algorithm for the recursive oracle identification problem.
If a quantum computer can identify a with one-sided4 error 1 − δ using time T and q queries in the non-
recursive problem, then we will show that the recursive version can be solved in time O((q log 1/δδ )
ℓT ). For
concreteness, suppose that |ϕa〉 = 1√
|X|
∑
x∈X(−1)f(a,x)|x〉, so that q = 1; the case when q > 1 is an
easy, but tedious, generalization. Suppose that our identifying quantum circuit is U , so a can be identified
by applying the POVM {Πa′}a′∈A with Πa′ = U † |a′〉〈a′|U to the state |ϕa〉.
The intuitive idea behind our algorithm is as follows: At each level, we find s(x1, . . . , xk) by recur-
sively computing s(x1, . . . , xk+1) for each xk+1 (in superposition) and using this information to create
many copies of |ϕs(x1,...,xk)〉, from which we can extract our answer. However, we need to account for the
errors carefully so that they do not blow up as we iterate the recursion. In what follows, we will adopt the
convention that Latin letters in kets (e.g. |a〉, |x〉, . . .) denote computational basis states, while Greek letters
(e.g. |ζ〉, |ϕ〉, . . .) are general states that are possibly superpositions over many computational basis states.
Also, we let the subscript (k) indicate a dependence on (x1, . . . , xk). The recursive oracle identification
algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm: FIND
Input: |x1, . . . , xk〉|0〉 for k < ℓ
Output: a(k) = s(x1, . . . , xk) up to error ε = (δ/8)2, where δ is the constant from the oracle. This means
|x1, . . . , xk〉
[√
1− ε(k)|0〉|a(k)〉|ζ(k)〉+√ε(k)|1〉|ζ ′(k)〉
]
, where ε(k) ≤ ε and |ζ(k)〉 and |ζ ′(k)〉 are arbitrary.
(We can assume this form without loss of generality by absorbing phases into |ζ(k)〉 and |ζ ′(k)〉.)
1. Create the superposition 1√
|X|
∑
xk+1∈X
|xk+1〉.
2. If k + 1 < ℓ then let a(k+1) = FIND(x1, . . . , xk+1) (with error ≤ ε), otherwise a(k+1) = ∅.
3. Call the oracle O(x1, . . . , xk+1, a(k+1)) to apply the phase (−1)f(s(x1,...,xk),xk+1) using the key a(k+1).
4. If k + 1 < ℓ then call FIND† to (approximately) uncompute a(k+1).
5. We are now left with |ϕ˜(k)〉, which is close to |ϕs(x1,...,xk)〉.
Repeat steps 1–4 m = 4δ ln
8
δ times to obtain |ϕ˜(k)〉⊗m
6. Coherently measure {Πa} on each copy and test the results (i.e. apply U , test the result, and apply U †).
7. If any tests pass, copy the correct a(k) to an output register, along with |0〉 to indicate success.
4 One-sided error is a reasonable demand given our access to a testing oracle. Most of these results go through with two-sided
error as well, but for notational simplicity, we will not explore them here.
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Otherwise put a |1〉 in the output to indicate failure.
8. Let everything else comprise the junk register |ζ(k)〉.
Theorem 4. Calling FIND on |0〉 solves the recursive oracle problem in quantum polynomial time.
Proof. The proof is by backward induction on k; we assume that the algorithm returns with error ≤ ε for
k + 1 and prove it for k. The initial step when k = ℓ is trivial since there is no need to compute aℓ+1, and
thus no source of error. If k < ℓ, then assume that correctness of the algorithm has already been proved for
k + 1. Therefore Step 2 leaves the state
1√|X|
∑
xk+1∈X
|xk+1〉
[√
1− ε(k+1)|0〉|a(k+1)〉|ζ(k+1)〉+
√
ε(k+1)|1〉|ζ ′(k+1)〉
]
.
In Step 3, we assume for simplicity that the oracle was called conditional on the success of Step 2. This
yields
|ψ′(k)〉 :=
1√|X|
∑
xk+1∈X
|xk+1〉
[
(−1)f(a(k) ,xk+1)
√
1− ε(k+1)|0〉|a(k+1)〉|ζ(k+1)〉+
√
ε(k+1)|1〉|ζ ′(k+1)〉
]
.
Now define the state |ψ(k)〉 by
|ψ(k)〉 :=
1√|X|
∑
xk+1∈X
(−1)f(a(k) ,xk+1)|xk+1〉
[√
1− ε(k+1)|0〉|a(k+1)〉|ζ(k+1)〉+
√
ε(k+1)|1〉|ζ ′(k+1)〉
]
.
Note that
〈ψ′(k)|ψ(k)〉 =
1
|X|
∑
xk+1∈X
(
1− ε(k+1) + (−1)f(a(k) ,xk+1)ε(k+1)
)
.
This quantity is real and always ≥ 1− 2ε(k+1) ≥
√
1− 4ε by the induction hypothesis. Let
|φ(k)〉 :=
1
|X|
∑
xk+1∈X
(−1)f(a(k) ,xk+1)|xk+1〉|0〉.
Note that FIND†|x1, . . . , xk, ψ(k)〉 = |x1, . . . , xk, φ(k)〉. Thus there exists ε(k) such that applying FIND†
to |x1, . . . , xk〉|ψ′(k)〉 yields
|x1, . . . , xk〉 ⊗
[√
1− 4ε(k)|φ(k)〉+
√
4ε(k)|φ′(k)〉
]
,
where 〈φ(k)|φ′(k)〉 = 0 and ε(k) ≤ ε.
We now want to analyze the effects of measuring {Πa} when we are given the state
|ϕ(k)〉 :=
√
1− 4ε(k)|φ(k)〉+
√
4ε(k)|φ′(k)〉
instead of |φ(k)〉. If we define ‖M‖1 = tr
√
M †M for a matrix M , then ‖ ∣∣ϕ(k)〉〈ϕ(k)∣∣− ∣∣φ(k)〉〈φ(k)∣∣ ‖1 =
4
√
ε(k) [FvdG99]. Thus
〈ϕ(k)|Πa(k) |ϕ(k)〉 ≥ 〈φ(k)|Πa(k) |φ(k)〉 − 4
√
ε(k) ≥ δ − 4
√
ε(k) ≥ δ/2.
In the last step we have chosen ε = (δ/8)2.
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Finally, we need to guarantee that with probability ≥ 1−ε at least one of the tests in Step 6 passes. After
applying U and the test oracle to |ϕ(k)〉, we have ≥
√
δ/2 overlap with a successful test and ≤ √1− δ/2
overlap with an unsuccessful test. When we repeat this m times, the amplitude in the subspace corresponding
to all tests failing is ≤ (1− δ/2)m/2 ≤ e−mδ/4. If we choose m = (2/δ) ln(1/ε) = (4/δ) ln(8/δ) then the
failure amplitude will be ≤ √ε, as desired.
To analyze the time complexity, first note that the run-time is O(T ) times the number of queries made
by the algorithm, and we have assumed that T is polynomial in n. Suppose the algorithm at level k requires
Q(k) queries. Then steps 2 and 4 require mQ(k + 1) queries each, steps 3 and 6 require m queries each
and together Q(k) = 2mQ(k + 1) + 2m. The base case is k = ℓ, for which Q(ℓ) = 0, since there are
no secret strings to calculate for the leaves. The total number of queries required for the algorithm is then
Q(0) ≈ (2m)2ℓ. If we choose ℓ = log n the quantum query complexity will thus be n2 log 2m = nO(1) and
the quantum complexity will be polynomial in n compared with the nΩ(logn) lower bound.
This concludes the demonstration of the polynomial-time quantum algorithm. Now we turn to the clas-
sical nΩ(log n) lower bound. Our key technical result is the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Define the recursive oracle identification problem as above, with a function f : A×X → {0, 1}
and a secret s : ∅ ∪X ∪X ×X ∪ . . . ∪Xℓ−1 7→ A encoded in an oracle O. Fix a deterministic classical
algorithm that makes ≤ Q queries toO. Then if s and ANS are chosen uniformly at random, the probability
that ANS is output by the algorithm is
≤ 1
2
+ max
(
Q
|A|1/3 −Q,Q
(
log |A|
3
)−ℓ)
.
Using Yao’s minimax principle and plugging in |A| = 2αn, ℓ = log n and Q = no(logn) readily yields
Theorem 6. If log |A| = nΩ(1) and ℓ = Ω(log n), then any randomized classical algorithm using Q =
no(logn) queries will have 12 + n
−Ω(log n) probability of successfully outputting ANS.
Proof (of Lemma 5). Let T = ∅ ∪X ∪ . . . ∪Xℓ denote the tree on which the oracle is defined. We say that
a node x ∈ T has been hit by the algorithm if position x has been queried by the oracle together with the
correct secret, i.e. O(s(x), x) has been queried. The only way to find to obtain information about ANS is
for the algorithm to query ∅ with the appropriate secret; in other words, to hit ∅.
For x, y ∈ T we say that x is an ancestor of y, and that y is a descendant of x, if y = x × z for some
z ∈ T . If z ∈ X then we say that y is a child of x and that x is a parent of y. Now define S ⊂ T to be the
set of all x ∈ T such that x has been hit but none of x’s ancestors have been. Also define a function d(x) to
be the depth of a node x; i.e. for all x ∈ Xk, d(x) = k. We combine these definitions to declare an invariant
Z =
∑
x∈S
(
log |A|
3
)−d(x)
The key properties of Z we need are that:
1. Initially Z = 0.
2. If the algorithm is successful then it terminates with Z = 1.
3. Only oracle queries change the value of Z .
4. Querying a leaf can add at most (log |A|/3)−ℓ to Z .
5. Querying an internal node (i.e. not a leaf) can add at most 2/(|A|1/3−Q) to EZ , where E indicates the
expectation over random choices of s.
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Combining these facts yields the desired bound.
Properties 1–4 follow directly from the definition (with the inequality in property 4 because it is possible
to query a node that has already been hit). To establish property 5, suppose that the algorithm queries node
x ∈ T and that it has previously hit k of x’s children. This gives us some partial information about s(x).
We can model this information as a partition of A into 2k disjoint sets A1, . . . , A2k (of which some could
be empty). From the k bits returned by the oracle on the k children of x we have successfully queried, we
know not only that s(x) ∈ A, but that s(x) ∈ Ai for some i ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}.
We will now divide the analysis into two cases. Either k ≤ 13 log |A| or k > 13 log |A|. We will argue
that in the former case, |Ai| is likely to be large, and so we are unlikely so successfully guess s(x), while
in the latter case even a successful guess will not increase Z . The latter case (k > 13 log |A|) is easier, so
we consider it first. In this case, Z only changes if x is hit in this step and neither x nor any of its ancestors
have been previously hit. Then even though hitting x will contribute (log |A|/3)−d(x) to Z , it will also
remove the k children from S (as well as any other descendants of x), which will decrease Z by at least
k(log |A|/3)−d(x)−1 > (log |A|/3)−d(x), resulting in a net decrease of Z .
Now suppose that k ≤ 13 log |A|. Recall that our information about s(x) can be expressed by the fact
that s(x) ∈ Ai for some i ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}. Since the values of s were chosen uniformly at random, we
have Pr(Ai) = |Ai|/|A|. Say that a set Ai is bad if |Ai| ≤ |A|2/3/2k . Then for a particular bad set Ai,
Pr(Ai) ≤ |A|−1/32−k. From the union bound, we see that the probability that any bad set is chosen is
≤ |A|−1/3.
Assume then that we have chosen a good set Ai, meaning that conditioned on the values of the children
there are |Ai| ≥ |A|2/3/2k ≥ |A|1/3 possible values of s(x). However, previous failed queries at x may
also have ruled out specific possible values of x. There have been at most Q queries at x, so there are ≥
|A|1/3−Q possible values of s(x) remaining. (Queries to any other nodes in the graph yield no information
on s(x).) Thus the probability of hitting x is ≤ 1/(|A|1/3−Q) if we have chosen a good set. We also have a
≤ |A|−1/3 probability of choosing a bad set, so the total probability of hitting x (in the k ≤ 13 log |A| case)
is ≤ |A|−1/3 + 1/(|A|1/3 −Q) ≤ 2/(|A|1/3 −Q). Finally, hitting x will increase Z by at most one, so the
largest possible increase of EZ when querying a non-leaf node is ≤ 2/(|A|1/3 − Q). This completes the
proof of property 5 and thus the Lemma.
4 Dispersing Circuits
In this section we define dispersing circuits and show how to construct an oracle problem with a constant
versus linear separation from any such circuit. In the next sections we will show how to find dispersing
circuits. Our strategy for finding speedups will be to start with a unitary circuit U which acts on n qubits and
has size polynomial in n. We will then try to find an oracle for which U efficiently solves the corresponding
oracle identification problem. Next we need to define a state |ϕa〉 that can be prepared with O(1) oracle calls
and hasΩ(1) overlap withU †|a〉. This is accomplished by letting |ϕa〉 be a state of the form 2−n/2
∑
x±|x〉.
We can prepare |ϕa〉 with only two oracle calls (or one, depending on the model), but to guarantee that
|〈a|U |ϕa〉| can be made large, we will need an additional condition on U . For any a ∈ A, U †|a〉 should have
amplitude that is mostly spread out over the entire computational basis. When this is the case, we say that U
is dispersing. The precise definition is as follows:
Definition 7. Let U be a quantum circuit on n qubits. For 0 < α, β ≤ 1, we say that U is (α, β)-dispersing
if there exists a set A ⊆ {0, 1}n with |A| ≥ 2αn and∑
x∈{0,1}n
|〈a|U |x〉| ≥ β2n2 . (3)
for all a ∈ A.
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Note that the LHS of (3) can also be interpreted as the L1 norm of U †|a〉.
The speedup in [BV97] uses U = H⊗n, which is (1,1)-dispersing since ∑x |〈a|H⊗n|x〉| = 2n/2 for all
a. Similarly the QFT over the cyclic group is (1,1)-dispersing.5 Nonabelian QFTs do not necessarily have
the same strong dispersing properties, but they satisfy a weaker definition that is still sufficient for a quantum
speedup. Suppose that the measurement operator is instead defined as Πa = U(|a〉〈a| ⊗ I)U †, where a is a
string on m bits and I denotes the identity operator on n−m bits. Then U still permits oracle identification,
but our requirements that U be dispersing are now relaxed. Here, we give a definition that is loose enough
for our purposes, although further weakening would still be possible.
Definition 8. Let U be a quantum circuit on n qubits. For 0 < α, β ≤ 1 and 0 < m ≤ n, we say that U
is (α, β)-pseudo-dispersing if there exists a set A ⊆ {0, 1}m with |A| ≥ 2αn such that for all a ∈ A there
exists a unit vector |ψ〉 ∈ C2n−m such that
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|〈a|〈ψ|U |x〉| ≥ β2n2 . (4)
This is a weaker property than being dispersing, meaning that any (α, β)-dispersing circuit is also (α, β)-
pseudo-dispersing.
We can now state our basic constant vs. linear query separation.
Theorem 9. If U is (α, β)-pseudo-dispersing, then there exists an oracle problem which can be solved with
one query, one use of U and success probability (2β/π)2. However, any classical randomized algorithm
that succeeds with probability ≥ δ must use ≥ αn+ log δ queries.
Before we prove this Theorem, we state a Lemma about how well states of the form 2−n/2
∑
x e
iφx |x〉
can be approximated by states of the form 2−n/2
∑
x±|x〉.
Lemma 10. For any vector (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ Cd there exists (θ1, . . . , θd) ∈ {±1}d such that∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
k=1
xkθk
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2π
d∑
k=1
|xk| .
The proof is in the full version of the paper[?].
Proof of Theorem 9: Since U is (α, β)-pseudo-dispersing, there exists a set A ⊂ {0, 1}m with |A| ≥ 2αn
and satisfying (4) for each a ∈ A. The problem will be to determine a by querying an oracle Oa(x). No
matter how we define the oracle, as long as it returns only one bit per call any classical randomized algorithm
making q queries can have success probability no greater than 2q−αn (or else guessing could succeed with
probability > 2−αn without making any queries). This implies the classical lower bound.
Given a ∈ A, to define the oracle Oa, first use the definition to choose a state |ψ〉 satisfying (4). Then
by Lemma 10 (below), choose a vector θ that (when normalized to |θ〉) will approximate the state U †|a〉|ψ〉.
Define Oa(x) so that (−1)Oa(x) = θx = 2n/2〈x|θ〉. By construction,
2−n/2|〈a|〈ψ|U |θ〉| ≥ 2
π
β (5)
which implies that creating |θ〉, applying U , and measuring the first register has probability ≥ (2β/π)2 of
yielding the correct answer a. ⊓⊔
5 Another possible way to generalize [BV97] is to consider other unitaries of the form U = A⊗n, for A ∈ U2. However, it is not
hard to show that the only way for such a U to be (Ω(1), Ω(1))-dispersing is for A to be of the form eiφ1σzHeiφ2σz .
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5 Any quantum Fourier transform is pseudo-dispersing
In this section we start with some special cases of dispersing circuits by showing that any Fourier transform
is dispersing. In the next section we show that most circuits are dispersing.
The original RFS paper [BV97] used the fact that H⊗n is (1,1)-dispersing to obtain their starting O(1)
vs Ω(n) separation. The QFT on the cyclic group (or any abelian group, in fact) is also (1,1)-dispersing. In
fact, if we will accept a pseudo-dispersing circuit, then any QFT will work:
Theorem 11. Let G be a group with irreps Gˆ and dλ denoting the dimension of irrep λ. Then the Fourier
transform over G is (α, 1/√2)-pseudo-dispersing, where α = (log∑λ dλ)/ log |G| ≥ 1/2.
Via Theorem 9 and Theorem 2, this implies that any QFT can be used to obtain a superpolynomial quantum
speedup. For most nonabelian QFTs, this is the first example of a problem which they can solve more quickly
than a classical computer.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 11). Let A = {(λ, i) : λ ∈ Gˆ, i ∈ {1, . . . , dλ}}.
Let Vλ denote the representation space corresponding to an irrep λ ∈ Gˆ. The Fourier transform on G
maps vectors in C[G] to superpositions of vectors of the form |λ〉|v1〉|v2〉 for |v1〉, |v2〉 ∈ Vλ.
Fix a particular choice of λ and |i〉 ∈ Vλ. If U denotes the QFT on G then let
ρ = U †
(
|λ〉〈λ| ⊗ |i〉〈i| ⊗ IVλ
dλ
)
U.
Define V := supp ρ, and let E|ψ〉∈V denote an expectation over |ψ〉 chosen uniformly at random from unit
vectors in V 6 Finally, let Π be the projector onto V . Note that ρ = Π/dλ = E |ψ〉〈ψ|.
Because of the invariance of ρ under right-multiplication by group elements (i.e. 〈g1|ρ|g2〉 = 〈g1h|ρ|g2h〉
for all g1, g2, h ∈ G), we have for any g that
〈g|ρ|g〉 = 1|G|
∑
h
〈gh|ρ|gh〉 = 1|G| tr(ρ) =
1
|G| . (6)
Since E |ψ〉〈ψ| = ρ, (6) implies that
E
|ψ〉∈V
|〈g|ψ〉|2 = 〈g|ρ|g〉 = 1|G| .
Next, we would like to analyze E |〈g|ψ〉|4.
E
|ψ〉
|〈g|ψ〉|4 = E
|ψ〉
tr (|g〉〈g| ⊗ |g〉〈g|) · (|ψ〉〈ψ| ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|) (7)
= tr (|g〉〈g| ⊗ |g〉〈g|) I + SWAP
dλ(dλ + 1)
(Π ⊗Π) (8)
≤ tr (|g〉〈g| ⊗ |g〉〈g|) · (I + SWAP)(ρ⊗ ρ) (9)
= 2(〈g|ρ|g〉)2 = 2|G|2 (10)
To prove the equality on the second line, we use a standard representation-theoretic trick (cf. section V.B
of [PSW06]). First note that |ψ〉⊗2 belongs to the symmetric subspace of V ⊗ V , which is a dλ(dλ+1)2 -
dimensional irrep of Udλ . Since E|ψ〉 |ψ〉〈ψ|⊗2 is invariant under conjugation by u ⊗ u for any u ∈ Udλ ,
6 We can think of |ψ〉 either as the result of applying a Haar uniform unitary to a fixed unit vector, or by choosing |ψ′〉 from any
rotationally invariant ensemble (e.g. choosing the real and imaginary part of each component to be an i.i.d. Gaussian with mean
zero) and setting |ψ〉 = |ψ′〉/
p
〈ψ′|ψ′〉.
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it follows that E|ψ〉 |ψ〉〈ψ|⊗2 is proportional to a projector onto the symmetric subspace of V ⊗2. Finally,
SWAPΠ⊗2 has eigenvalue 1 on the symmetric subspace of V ⊗2 and eigenvalue −1 on its orthogonal com-
plement, the antisymmetric subspace of V ⊗2. Thus, I+SWAP2 Π
⊗2 projects onto the symmetric subspace and
we conclude that
E
|ψ〉
|ψ〉〈ψ|⊗2 = (I + SWAP)(Π ⊗Π)
dλ(dλ + 1)
.
Now we note the inequality
E |Y | ≥ (E Y 2) 32 /(E Y 4) 12 , (11)
which holds for any random variable Y and can be proved using Ho¨lder’s inequality [Ber97]. Setting Y =
|〈g|ψ〉|, we can bound E|ψ〉 |〈g|ψ〉| ≥ 1/
√
2|G|. Summing over G, we find
E
|ψ〉
∑
g∈G
|〈g|ψ〉| ≥ 1√
2
√
|G|.
Finally, because this last inequality holds in expectation, it must also hold for at least some choice of |ψ〉.
Thus there exists |ψ〉 ∈ V such that ∑
g∈G
|〈g|ψ〉| ≥ 1√
2
√
|G|.
Then U satisfies the pseudo-dispersing condition in (4) for the state |ψ〉 with β = 1/√2.
This construction works for each λ ∈ Gˆ and for |v1〉 running over any choice of basis of Vλ. Together,
this comprises
∑
λ∈Gˆ dλ vectors in the set A.
6 Most circuits are dispersing
Our final, and most general, method of constructing dispersing circuits is simply to choose a polynomial-size
random circuit. We define a length-t random circuit to consist of performing the following steps t times.
1. Choose two distinct qubits i, j at random from [n].
2. Choose a Haar-distributed random U ∈ U4.
3. Apply U to qubits i and j.
A similar model of random circuits was considered in [DOP07]. Our main result about these random circuits
is the following Theorem.
Theorem 12. For any α, β > 0, there exists a constant C such that if U is a random circuit on n qubits of
length t = Cn3 then U is (α, β)-dispersing with probability
≥ 1− 2β
2
1− 2−n(1−α) .
Theorem 12 is proved in the extended version of this paper[?]. The idea of the proof is to reduce the evo-
lution of the fourth moments of the random circuit (i.e. quantities of the form EU trUM1U †M2UM3U †M4)
to a classical Markov chain, using the approach of [DOP07]. Then we show that this Markov chain has a gap
of Ω(1/n2), so that circuits of length O(n3) have fourth moments nearly identical to those of Haar-uniform
unitaries from U2n . Finally, we use (11), just as we did for quantum Fourier transforms, to show that a large
fraction of inputs are likely to be mapped to states with large L1-norm. This will prove Theorem 12 and
show that superpolynomial quantum speedups can be built by plugging almost any circuit into the recursive
framework we describe in Section 3.
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A Most circuits are dispersing
In this Appendix we prove Theorem 12.
Suppose we start in a computational basis state |a〉, and after t steps of a random circuit (described in
Section 6), we have the state |ψt〉. Let U † denote the circuit we have applied, and let ψt denote |ψt〉〈ψt|, so
that ψt = U † |a〉〈a|U . For p ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n let σp denote the tensor product of Pauli matrices σp1⊗· · ·⊗σpn,
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where {σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3} are the usual single-qubit Pauli matrices {I, σz , σx, σy}. Then we can expand ψt in
the Pauli basis (following [DOP07]) as
ψt = 2
−n
2
∑
p
γt(p)σp,
where γt(p) = 2−
n
2 trψtσp. The advantage of this approach is that each γt(p) is real and
∑
p γ
2
t (p) = 1, so
we can think of {γ2t (p)} as a probability distribution on p ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n .
Indeed, by an argument similar to that in [DOP07], we can show how {EC γ2t (p)} evolves in a way
that can be described as a Markov chain on {0, 1, 2, 3}n . (Here the expectation is taken over the choice of
random quantum circuit.)
Lemma 13. Random quantum circuits are such that {EC γ2t (p)} evolve according to the following Markov
chain on {0, 1, 2, 3}n:
– Select i 6= j randomly from [n].
– If pi = pj = 0 then do nothing.
– Otherwise set (pi, pj) to a random element of {0, 1, 2, 3}2\{(0, 0)}.
Furthermore, this Markov chain satisfies the following properties.
1. This Markov chain is irreducible and ergodic once we delete the isolated vertex 0n.
2. Its stationary distribution (when starting with any physical state) has γ2(0n) = 2−n, but otherwise is
uniform on p 6= 0n, i.e. γ2(p) = 4−n/(1 + 2−n) for all p ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n .
3. Its spectral gap is ≥ Ω(1/n2).
4. There exists a constant C such that if t ≥ Cn3 and if the initial state is a computational basis state then
EC γ
2
t (p) ≤ 4−n for all p 6= 0n.
Before proving the Lemma, we show how it implies Theorem 12. Fix an input |a〉, apply t random two-
qubit unitaries as described above to yield the state |ψt〉, and define Qt :=
∑
x |〈x|ψt〉|4. Expanding ψt in
terms of σp, we obtain
Qt = 2
−n
∑
x
〈x|
∑
p∈{0,1,2,3}n
γt(p)σp|x〉〈x|
∑
q∈{0,1,2,3}n
γt(q)σq|x〉.
Now 〈x|σp|x〉 will be zero if p contains any 2’s or 3’s, since each of these lead to bit flips. So we can restrict
our sum to p’s and q’s that are strings of 0’s and 1’s (corresponding to I and σz). Moreover, if p is such a
string, then 〈x|σp|x〉 = (−1)p·x. Thus
Qt = 2
−n
∑
p∈{0,1}n,q∈{0,1}n
γt(p)γt(q)
∑
x
(−1)(p+q)·x =
∑
p∈{0,1}n
γ2t (p).
To bound this sum, we use the last part of Lemma 13 together with γ2t (0n) = 2−n to find
E
C
Qt ≤ 2 · 2−n.
Thus, Markov’s inequality implies that
Pr
C
(
Qt ≥ 2
−n
β2
)
≤ 2β2.
14 Sean Hallgren and Aram W. Harrow
Now consider the event that Qt ≤ 2−n/β2. We will use this to lower-bound
∑
x |〈x|ψt〉|. To do so,
we define a random variable Y to equal |〈x|ψt〉| for a uniformly random choice of x ∈ {0, 1}n. Then
Ex Y
2 = 2−n, Ex Y
4 ≤ β−2 · 4−n, and by (11), Ex Y = Ex |Y | ≥ 2−n/2β. Thus
∑
x |〈x|ψt〉| ≥ β2n/2.
Putting this together, we see that for any fixed input |a〉, and for all but a 2β2-fraction of (sufficiently
long) random circuits, ∑
x∈{0,1}n
|〈x|U †|a〉| ≥ β2n2 .
Say that a pair (U, a) is bad when this does not hold. So for any a, the probability over U ∈ C that (U, a) is
bad is ≤ 2β2. Thus Markov’s inequality implies that
Pr
U∈C
[
Pr
a
[(U, a) is bad] ≥ 1− 2−(1−α)n
]
≤ 2β
2
1− 2−(1−α)n .
Turning this around, we conclude that a random circuit U ∈ C is (α, β)-dispersing (meaning that (U, a)
is good for ≥ 2αn values of a) with probability ≥ 1 − 2β2/(1 − 2−(1−α)n). Thus, we can obtain a quan-
tum/classical separation from almost any quantum circuit with uniformly bounded parameters for both the
quantum upper bound and the classical lower bound.
Recent work[HL08] has improved the analysis of the Markov chain to show that the gap is Ω(1/n) and
hence that circuits of length O(n2) are generically dispersing.
Proof of Lemma 13: The reduction of the quantum random circuit to a classical Markov chain is due to
[DOP07], but we will present an alternate, shorter proof in order to have a self-contained presentation.
First, we show that γt(p)2 follows a Markov chain. Recall that ψt = 2−n/2
∑
p γt(p)σp and let W denote
the random unitary applied at time t+ 1. Then ψt+1 = WψtW †. Since W acts only on two qubits, we can
assume for the purpose of this analysis that n = 2, so W ∈ U4. Then
γt+1(p) =
1
2
trσpWψtW
† =
1
4
∑
q∈{0,1,2,3}2
γt(q) tr σpWσqW
†,
and
γ2t+1(p) =
1
16
∑
q,q′∈{0,1,2,3}2
γt(q)γt(q
′) trσpWσqW
† trσpWσq′W
† (12)
=
∑
q,q′∈{0,1,2,3}2
γt(q)γt(q
′)〈p, p| ad⊗2W |q, q′〉. (13)
Here adW is an operator on C16 defined by 〈p| adW |q〉 := trσpWσqW †/4 for p, q ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}2 . When
we take the expectation over random choices of W , we obtain
E γ2t+1(p) =
∑
q,q′∈{0,1,2,3}2
γt(q)γt(q
′)〈p, p|
(
E
W
ad⊗2W
)
|q, q′〉. (14)
Define
|ξ〉 = 1√
15
∑
p∈{0,1,2,3}2\{(0,0)}
|p〉|p〉. (15)
We claim that EW ad⊗2W = |00〉〈00| + |ξ〉〈ξ|. Since 〈p, p|ξ〉〈ξ|q, q′〉 is equal to 1/15 when p 6= 00 and
q = q′ 6= 00, and zero otherwise, we will have
E
W
〈p, p| ad⊗2W |q, q′〉 =


1 if p = q = q′ = 00
1
15 if p 6= 00 and q = q′ 6= 00
0 otherwise
,
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as claimed in the lemma.
To prove that EW ad⊗2W = |00〉〈00| + |ξ〉〈ξ|, we will use representation theory. Schur’s Lemma implies
that EW ad⊗2W is a projector onto the invariant subspace of ad⊗2W . For any integers λ1 ≥ . . . ≥ λd, we have
an irrep of Ud, which we call Qdλ. The conjugate irrep of Qdλ, obtained by taking the complex conjugate of
each representation matrix, is given by (Qdλ)∗ ∼= Qdλ′ , where λ′ = (−λd,−λd−1, . . . ,−λ1).
The simplest non-trivial Ud representation is the defining representation Qd(1) ∼= Cd, where U ∈ Ud is
mapped to itself. Here we have dropped trailing zeros, so (1) is equivalent to (1, 0, 0, 0). Now observe that
W → adW is a representation of U4 that is equivalent to Q4(1) ⊗ (Q4(1))∗ ∼= Q4(1) ⊗ Q4(0,0,0,−1). Now we
apply the Clebsch-Gordan decomposition of the adjoint representation Q4(1) ⊗Q4(0,0,0,−1) to obtain
Q4(1) ⊗Q4(0,0,0,−1) ∼= Q4(0) ⊕Q4(1,0,0,−1),
meaning the direct sum of a trivial irrep Q4(0) and a 15-dimensional irrep Q4(1,0,0,−1). To find the invariant
subspace of ad⊗2W , we will need to find the invariant subspace of
(Q4(0) ⊕Q4(1,0,0,−1))⊗2 = (Q4(0))⊗2 ⊕ (Q4(0) ⊗Q4(1,0,0,−1))⊕ (Q4(1,0,0,−1) ⊗Q4(0))⊕ (Q4(1,0,0,−1))⊗2.
Since Q4(0) is the trivial representation, Q4(0) ⊗ Q4(0) is trivial as well, and the projector onto it is given
by |00〉〈00|. Next Q4(0) ⊗ Q4(1,0,0,−1) ∼= Q4(1,0,0,−1), and thus has no invariant subspace. Similarly for
Q4(1,0,0,−1)⊗Q4(0) has no invariant subspace.Q4(1,0,0,−1) is self-dual, and thus by Schur’s Lemma,Q4(1,0,0,−1)⊗
Q4(1,0,0,−1) has a one-dimensional invariant subspace. To determine this subspace we observe that in the basis
{|p〉}p∈{0,1,2,3}2\{(0,0)}, the representation matrices ofQ4(1,0,0,−1) are real. Also (A⊗I)|ξ〉 = (I⊗AT )|ξ〉 for
any matrix A and for |ξ〉 defined in (15). Together this means that |ξ〉 is an invariant vector in Q4(1,0,0,−1) ⊗
Q4(1,0,0,−1), and in fact spans its invariant subspace. We conclude that EW ad⊗2W = |00〉〈00| + |ξ〉〈ξ|.
We now turn to the analysis of the classical Markov chain. Similar arguments were used in [DOP07] and
a tighter analysis is forthcoming in [HL08]. First, we claim that the Markov chain is ergodic and irreducible
outside the vertex 0n. Irreducibility follows from the fact that every nonzero vertex is connected to 1n, while
the presence of self-loops implies ergodicity. We can verify the stationary distribution from the detailed
balance condition using a short calculation.
For the gap we will use the comparison method of Diaconis and Saloff-Coste [DS96]. Consider a Markov
chain that picks two random sites and replaces them each with random numbers from {0, 1, 2, 3} subject
only to avoiding the state 0n. It follows from [DS96, Thm 3.2] that this chain has gap ≥ 2/n, and applying
the comparison method ([DS96, Thm 3.3]) to the Markov chain described in Lemma 13 yields a lower bound
of 1/n2 for its gap.
To prove the final claim of Lemma 13, we want to choose C sufficiently large so that
|E γ2t (p)− 4−n/(1 + 2−n)| ≤ 2−4n (16)
whenever t ≥ Cn3. Note that any computational basis state has overlap exp(−O(n)) with the stationary
distribution. Since the gap is Ω(1/n2), we can then use standard bounds on the mixing time of Markov
chains (e.g. [DS96, Lemma 2.8]) to show that (16) holds when t ≥ Cn3 for some constant C .
B Proof of Lemma 10
We want to bound
max
θ
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
k=1
θkxk
∣∣∣∣∣ = maxφ maxθ Re
(
eiφ
d∑
k=1
θkxk
)
.
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Here φ is maximized over [0, 2π], and Re(z) refers to the real part of a complex number z. We can now
move the maximization over θ inside the sum to obtain
max
φ
max
θ
Re
(
eiφ
d∑
k=1
θkxk
)
= max
φ
d∑
k=1
max
θk∈{±1}
Re
(
eiφθkxk
)
(17)
= max
φ
d∑
k=1
∣∣∣Re(eiφxk)∣∣∣ ≥ E
φ
d∑
k=1
∣∣∣Re(eiφxk)∣∣∣ (18)
= E
φ
d∑
k=1
|xk| · | cosφ| = 2
π
d∑
k=1
|xk|. (19)
Eφ indicates the expectation over φ chosen uniformly at random from [0, 2π], and the second to last equality
uses the rotational invariance of the distribution of φ. ⊓⊔
